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ABSTRACT

Two of the major problems confronting the legal profession today are increasing
rates of job dissatisfaction and the persistent problem of encouraging lawyers to work in
public interest settings. These two problems are actually connected in an important way.
Researchers have found that lawyers earning the highest salaries, typically in large law
firms, are also the most dissatisfied with their profession, while lawyers working for
government agencies, public interest organizations, and educational institutions are among
the most satisfied. In other words, encouraging more law students to enter public service
law could address both the problem of unhappiness in the profession and the underrepresentation of disadvantaged people with legal needs. Indeed, by reconnecting the legal
profession with the notion of service to society, a professional ethic that seems to have
disappeared in recent decades, we may be able to improve the profession more broadly for
its own sake and for the positive impact it can and should have on society at large.
In this essay, I examine why and how so many law students who have no intention of
working at a firm or are interested in public interest as they begin law school end up
accepting offers from large firms upon graduation. To address this paradox, we must
understand the logical processes law students use in making their career decisions, and how
these process may be flawed or biased. Recent findings in behavioral economics, which
show the limits of rationality, shed light on this question. In particular, behavioral
economics shows us that people have bounded willpower, bounded rationality and bounded
self-interest, which all serve to encourage behavior which is not strictly self-interest
maximizing, as that concept is understood in traditional economics.
In this article, I argue that law students have shown bounded willpower, bounded
rationality and bounded self-interest in this context. I divide this essay into three parts. In
the first part, I address this question by looking at the bounded willpower, bounded
rationality, and bounded self-interest of law school students. In the second part, I look at the
effectiveness, or lack thereof, of different ways law schools have responded to the limited
rationality shown by students, in particular public interest requirements and loan forgiveness
plans. In the final part, I make suggestions for ways of addressing this issue, in light of the
lessons learned from the first two parts.
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Two of the major problems confronting the legal profession today are increasing
rates of job dissatisfaction and the persistent problem of encouraging lawyers to work in
public interest settings. The high reported rates of job dissatisfaction in the legal profession,
the high attrition rates at major firms, and the large numbers of attorneys who "drop out" of
the profession altogether have been the subject of much concern and criticism for several
years now.1 Unhappy lawyers are less effective for their clients, discourage the best
students from entering the profession, and diminish the profession generally. A second
problem is the unmet legal needs of poor and disadvantaged members of society. Despite
the efforts of many public and private attorneys, disadvantaged clients do not receive nearly
enough legal representation as they need.2
These two problems are actually connected in an important way. Researchers have
found that lawyers earning the highest salaries, typically in large law firms, are also the most
dissatisfied with their profession, while lawyers working for government agencies, public
interest organizations, and educational institutions are among the most satisfied.3 In other
words, encouraging more law students to enter public service law could address both the
problem of unhappiness in the profession and the under-representation of disadvantaged
people with legal needs. Indeed, by reconnecting the legal profession with the notion of
service to society, a professional ethic that seems to have disappeared in recent decades, we
1 See John Heinz et al., Lawyers and their Discontents: Findingsfrom a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 IND.
L.J. 735 (1999); Patrick Schiltz, On Being Happy, Healthy and EthicalMember of an Unhappy, Unhealthy
and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999); Michael Goldhaber, Is the PromisedLand
Heaven or Hell?, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 1999, at A17.
2 Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey ofAmericans- Major Findings of the Comprehensive Legal Needs
Study, A.B.A. (1994) (study found that the combined efforts of the private bar, individual lawyers and
publicly funded legal services programs can serve only a small portion- about 20 percent- of the civil legal

needs reported by low-income households).
3

Ken Dau-Schmidt and Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, "The Fruits of Our Labors: An Empirical Study of the
Distribution of Income and Job Satisfaction Over the Legal Profession", 49 J. of Legal Edu. 342 (1999).
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may be able to improve the profession more broadly for its own sake and for the positive
impact it can and should have on society at large.
Nevertheless, law firms continue to be the dominant career choice and goal for law
students. Indeed, many students who enter law school with public service ideals and goals
end up turning their focus to large firms during their law school careers.
In this essay, I examine why and how so many law students who have no intention of
working at a firm or are interested in public interest as they begin law school end up
accepting offers from large firms upon graduation. The fact that most law students pursue
these positions despite the fact that they know about the low job satisfaction and high
turnover rates at these firms is particularly curious to me. Many students who are personally
committed to public service and privately critical of the firms accept job offers from these
firms anyway.
There appears to be a paradox: why would students seemingly act against their own
values and self-interest in making post-graduation plans? To address this paradox, we must
understand the logical processes law students use in making their career decisions, and how
these process may be flawed or biased. Recent findings in behavioral economics, which
show the limits of rationality, shed light on this question. In particular, behavioral
economics shows us that people have bounded willpower, bounded rationality and bounded
self-interest, which all serve to encourage behavior which is not strictly self-interest
maximizing, as that concept is understood in traditional economics. In this article, I argue
that law students have shown bounded willpower, bounded rationality and bounded selfinterest in this context.
Law school students should be among the most rational people in the country. To
56
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get into law school, they had to perform well on a test that focuses primarily on logical
reasoning. Their time in law school is supposedly teaching them to "think like lawyers" -that is, to analyze situations rationally and make good decisions based on calculations of
costs and benefits. A lawyer is supposed to think coolly and logically, and not be distracted
by sophistry or sentimentality. The fact that a group of people who are selected by their
demonstrated logical skills and trained to refine these skills display such limitations on
rationality, as it is defined in traditional economics, is a powerful demonstration of the
human tendency to be less than fully rational.
In this essay, I want to explore the question of why so many law school students
choose to work at firms upon graduation, as opposed to public interest, despite their initial
tendencies to do otherwise and their knowledge of the high degree of job dissatisfaction of
other people in these positions. I divide this essay into three parts. In the first part, I address
this question by looking at the bounded willpower, bounded rationality, and bounded selfinterest of law school students. In the second part, I look at the effectiveness, or lack
thereof, of different ways law schools have responded to the limited rationality shown by
students, in particular public interest requirements and loan forgiveness plans. In the final
part, I make suggestions for ways of addressing this issue, in light of the lessons learned
from the first two parts.

I. THE CHOICE OF LAW FIRMS FOR PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT

In this section, I will examine the behaviors that influence so many students to choose
57
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positions at law firms as their first jobs after graduation. I divide it into three parts: bounded
willpower, bounded rationality, and bounded self-interest.

A. Bounded Willpower

Bounded willpower refers to the idea that people sometimes take actions that they
know to be in conflict with their own long-term interests. The paradigm model is that of
smoking, an activity that many people engage in despite their knowledge of the long-term
health risks. Of course smoking is physiologically addictive, but bounded willpower can
manifest itself in other situations. A person starting a diet may throw out all of the junk food
in her house. To a traditional economist, this behavior is irrational. If she does not want the
food, she does not have to eat it, but there is no reason to foreclose options but throwing the
food out. But, the dieter understands that she has bounded willpower, that is, she can be
tempted to do something she knows is not in her best interests. She throws out the food to
prevent future temptation.

4

Many law students choose to work at firms even though they know or suspect that
they will not be happy there. This is not a result of addiction, as in the case of smoking.
Rather, I believe this is a result of a more complex and subtle interaction of different factors.
First, many students enter law school without a strong idea at all of what they want to do
after graduation. As a result, their job preferences are particularly unstable and open to
external influence. Second, law firms try early and often to persuade students to work for

4

Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to BehavioralEconomics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
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them, by offering high initial salaries, fun summer experiences, and other temptations.
Finally, peer pressure and the norms of law school and the legal profession pull students
towards the firm track.
Many students enter law school without a clear idea of how or even if they want to
practice law. In fact, law students often had impractical majors in college, and were
convinced to go to law school by the breadth of subject matter and the argument that it was a
good general degree that could be used in many different ways.

Unlike students in

business or public policy schools, many, if not most, law students have little or no full-time,
non-summer professional experience, and often go to law school directly from college.
Unlike medical school students, law students do not see themselves as entering a program of
study and training that will last several years and require a concomitant long-term
commitment. Law school is perhaps the most susceptible of the major professional schools
to attract students with unclear professional goals and thus open to outside influence.
Because their preferences are unstable, law students are especially vulnerable to
external influences on their preferences. Law firms take advantage of this situation by
trying to tempt students from early on to work in their offices. During recruiting season at
major law schools, many firms hold parties or cocktails open to all students, including ILs.
They send representatives to speak on panels, stuff fliers in student boxes, and give away
free gifts. On callbacks, they wine and dine their prospects. Summer programs are
notoriously unrepresentative experiences, where associates do little work and spend much
time at ballgames, parties, concerts, clubs, and restaurants. Of course, every industry tries to
recruit promising students. But, law firms are noteworthy for the lengths they go to in their
recruiting efforts, the degree to which they misrepresent their workplaces, their focus on
59
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even first-year students, and their early extension of offers, sometimes even to students in
the fall of their second year. Law firms realize that law students have unstable preferences
and are open to influence, and they try to fill this gap in student preference through early,
frequent, and aggressive recruiting.
A more subtle influence on student choice is the norms of their classmates and the
legal professional in general. Studies have shown that social norms have a significant
influence on human behavior. In one famous study, parents who sent their children to a
child-care center in Israel were first told it was important to pick their children up on time.
They were later told that if they did not pick their children up on time, they would have to
pay a fine. Paradoxically, more parents arrived late after the policy change than before. The
reason behind this surprising result is that the fine made showing up late more socially
acceptable as long as the fine was paid. It was the "price" for being late that some parents
were willing to pay, whereas before, arriving late was simply socially unacceptable. In
strictly financial terms, the cost-benefit calculation of arriving late was actually inferior after
the policy change, yet many more parents arrived late. In other words, people are influenced
in their decision-making by how they will be perceived by others or even by themselves in
the light of prevailing social norms.5
In the context of our study, there is heavy social pressure on law students to work at
firms because so many of their friends and classmates are doing so or trying to do so. It is
also expected of them by many of their outside friends and family members who want
"successful" children or would not understand a decision to forgo the salary and prestige of a
firm job. This social pressure is increased by denigrating the work of legal aid
5

Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, XXIX J. LEGAL STUD., 1 (2000).
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organizations. Among lawyers at firms, it is not uncommon to present legal aid work as
simplistic or do-gooding, as providing inadequate training, challenge or support, of not
being "real" legal work, or for lawyers who can not "cut it" at a firm. All of these influences
prevail on students to accept the conceit that firm work is the norm for those entering the
legal profession and that public interest work is an aberration from this norm. Firm jobs
have become seen as the safer choice, the default option, and the expected for law students
by the successful imposition of this social norm in the law school world and legal profession
generally.

B. Bounded Rationality

1. Undervaluing Opportunity Cost

One striking instance of human departure from economic rationality, traditionally defined, is
the differing treatment of actual income or cost and opportunity income or cost. Mark
Kelman points out a number of examples of this behavior. A man refuses to sell an
expensive bottle of wine he received as a gift for $100 though he would never buy one at
that price. A consumer refuses to sell his black-and-white television set that he has had for
many years for $50, although he would never buy it at that price. Business students at the
University of Chicago were willing to pay much more not to be exposed to a disease than
they were willing to pay for an antidote from a disease they may already have. Major
league baseball teams will not match competing offers for a free agent though they would
not have traded him at an equivalent price. A consistent feature of these and other real61
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world examples is the human tendency to undervalue opportunity cost in relation to actual
6

cost.

This behavior is exhibited by law students in their evaluation of firm offers in
relation to public interest opportunities. Firms offer very high salaries, often $140,000 for
first-year associates at large firms in major cities. 7 They also offer year-end bonuses,
moving costs or other starting bonuses, and generous benefits. Government positions pay
less than half of that, and legal aid position pay less than one-third of that, with many paying
first-year attorneys less than $40,000. In terms of "actual" salary, firms seem to offer much
more income for the work expended.
However, this calculus overlooks many important costs of working at a large law
firm that may be less apparent and harder to valuate than the salary offer, which is explicit
and quantifiable. First, taxes will be much higher for an individual at that salary, and he will
not benefit from his school's loan forgiveness program (I talk more about loan forgiveness
programs in section 11.2). These two factors alone narrow the pay gap. Second, the firm
associate will be working much longer hours. It is not uncommon for new associates at
firms to work 60, 70, or even 80 hours a week -- 20% to 100% more than a government or
legal aid attorney (assuming he or she works 40-50 hours a week). An associate at a
prestigious firm often lives in New York, Washington, or other cities where the cost of
living, particularly housing, is much more expensive than in the rest of the country. Firm
associates have less autonomy and freedom in their work than a legal aid attorney. They
have to keep track of their work for billing purposes, and often are given tedious

6

Mark Kelman, Law and BehavioralScience: Conceptual Overviews, NW. U. L. REV. (2003).

7 Current salaries at major law firms can be found at: <http://www.studyworld.com/law-firm-salaries.htm
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assignments. They do not interact with clients nearly as much, and their clients are less
sympathetic. Many find the work environment to be competitive and non-supportive.
To be sure, there are advantages to firm work over legal aid work. There is more
secretarial and administrative support. The offices are more comfortable and modern.
There is more formal training, and the work, at higher levels, may be more sophisticated.
And, of course, everybody values these various factors differently. However, on balance,
when the opportunity cost of law firm work, as opposed to public interest, is taken into
account -- the hours, the clients, the work environment, etc. -- the calculation of the relative

worth of each position is much closer than a pure salary comparison would indicate.

2. The "Sunk Cost" Error

There is a famous experiment in economics called the ultimatum game. In this
game, player A is told he has $100, which he can split in any way he sees fit with player B.
Player B can either reject the offer, in which case neither player makes any money, or can
accept the offer. Under classical economic assumptions, player B should accept whatever is
offered to him, even if it is one cent. Based on cost-benefit analysis, his choice under that
scenario is between one cent and nothing, and the former is better. Player A understands
this, and therefore he will only offer one cent. However, when economists tried this
experiment with actual people, they discovered that most people rejected extremely low
offers, even though this was not strictly "rational". The researchers found that people were
willing to sacrifice a certain amount of self-interest if they felt they were being cheated or
mistreated. In other words, people are willing to damage their own self-interest in order to
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spite an unfair player or to uphold their sense of fairness and propriety. This can be seen as
a quasi-rational aberration from the economic expectation that people will or should ignore
sunk costs.

8

However, sometimes people factor in sunk costs simply out of logical error. We all
know the theater season-ticket holder who will go to a play he does not want to see because
he has already paid for it. My mother will eat food she has ordered even if she does not like
it because she has already paid for it, no matter how many times I try to explain the illogic
of this behavior. In theory, we should only factor in future benefits and future costs in our
decision-making, but the reality is that people frequently do otherwise. For some reason,
humans will factor in sunk costs in their decision-making even when it defies logical
reasoning.
The student who chooses a public interest job will inevitably encounter someone
who says something to the effect of, "Do you feel the expense of law school was a waste
since you are going to work in public interest?" or "Since you paid so much to get to this
point, aren't you entitled to a high-paying position?" Of course, this question ignores the
intrinsic value of a good education, the difficulty of getting public interest jobs, and
changing priorities a student may have over time as her career develops. But, even
assuming that these other things do not matter, the rationale underlying this question is
logically incorrect. Regardless of the costs, financial and otherwise, associated with law
school, the question is which job is relatively most beneficial going forward. Even if those
costs were "too" high, the problem would only be exacerbated by using those spent costs to

8 Richard Thaler, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS, Chapter 10 ("Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market"), pp. 199-219.
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justify a sub-optimal course of action. The amount of money paid for law school, therefore,
should be irrelevant to post-graduation job decisions.
Nevertheless, this mistaken desire not to "waste" their expensive education may be a
factor behind many students' decision to go to law firms. Because firm jobs are seen as
more exclusive and prestigious, students feel they have earned, through their hard work and
sacrifice, the privilege to work in these offices. Firms do a good job of heightening this
sense of winning a competition or prize among their hirees, through rhetoric, perks, and selfcongratulatory celebrations. Many students feel that they would be giving up an honor and
wasting the hard work that achieved that honor by rejecting firm offers. They fail to ignore
these past efforts as sunk costs, and simply evaluate what they want to do in the future. This
error of factoring in sunk costs leads many of them to dig the hole deeper by taking a
position that they will not find satisfying. Students should ignore the conceit that they have
"earned" a firm job or that to reject one would be a "waste" of their education, and think
about job plans purely in terms of the costs and benefits going forward.

3. Judgment Heuristics

a. The availabilityheuristic

The availability heuristic occurs because people associate the frequency of a class by
the ease with which they can recall specific instances of that class occurring. Logical errors
result when people are over- or under-exposed to certain phenomena. For example, people
overestimate the number of deaths in their society caused by highly-publicized events like
65
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homicides and airplane crashes and underestimate the frequencies of quieter fatalities like
diabetes. Because airplane crashes are always major news events, people are highly exposed
to them and liable to overestimate their actual rate of occurrence. Conversely, people do not
believe diabetes is a major cause of death, though it kills far more people than airline
9
crashes, because it is relatively underexposed in the media.

Law students are sometimes surprised to learn how most lawyers practice their
profession. A student could easily go through three years of a major American law school
without realizing that the vast majority of lawyers in the United States do not work at large
corporate law firms. The vast majority of firms that recruit and interview on campus are
large firms in large cities that work primarily for large corporate clients. Students' summer
experiences are either at these kinds of firms, federal government agencies, or nongovernmental organizations, but rarely at the kinds of places and with the kind of work that
most lawyers experience. The class work at most law schools emphasizes high-end
appellate litigation that actually occupies a tiny percentage of the legal bar, even among
graduates of elite schools. As a result of these experiences, students often have a skewed
view of the legal profession, seeing large firm work as the norm, and anything else as a
deviation, whereas the opposite is closer to the truth.
Similarly, the availability heuristic may lead students to overestimate their chance of
enjoying their work at firms or of becoming partner. Through their interviews, recruiting
cocktails and other campus programs, they often meet with partners or seemingly happy
associates. They are not equally exposed to disgruntled associates, those who have left the

9

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristicfor JudgingFrequency and Probability,5
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL., 207 (1973).
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firm out of dissatisfaction or failure to make partner, or those who are less able to
demonstrate happiness and enthusiasm. Once more, this skewed exposure may lead to

skewed judgments about the job satisfaction and partnership prospects of such
organizations. In this instance, the availability heuristic may interact with human overoptimism, which I discuss below, to lead students to seriously overestimate their prospects
in this work setting.

b. The representativenessheuristic

People use mental models to judge the likelihood of an event occurring. Connected
to this, people are more likely to predict a future event if they can conceive of a convincing
scenario in which that event occurs.1 0 This heuristic may subtly influence students' decision
to work at firms. Based on movies, books, television programs and the law school
experience itself, the model of a law student going to work at a major corporate law firm is
much easier to conceive of than that same student working at, let us say, a state attorney
general's office. Therefore, he is more likely to envision that scenario as a possible future
outcome for himself. As a result, he is more likely to investigate and pursue this possibility.
As he develops a conception of himself and his place in the world, this model works
on his mind until he sees himself as the lawyer he envisions he will become. The firm job,
because it seems so representative of the model career path of people in his class or that he
associates himself with, subtly becomes the probable choice or default option. Perhaps even
without noticing it, he finds himself heading down this path, not even knowing why or how
10 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, On the Psychology of Prediction,80 PSYCHOL. REV., 237 (1973).
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it happened. It is striking to talk to law students during their IL, 2L, and 3L years and see
how slowly but surely their self-conception of who they are and who they will become
evolves from idealism to pragmatism, from rejecting law firms to embracing them. The
model of the high-powered, well-compensated attorney that they are constantly exposed to
over a three-year period affects students' expectations of their own futures.

4. Unrealistic Optimism

A famous economics study a few years ago found that low-level gang members get
paid very little for the amount of risk they take, in terms of exposure to violence and
criminal liability. The explanation for this behavior was that street gangs use economic
models similar to those used by large firms -- that is, many people toil at the bottom rungs
for the chance, however small, of rising to the top, where the compensation is very high.
Both organizations rely on people's optimism that they are the ones who will defy the
odds." As other studies have demonstrated, people are overly optimistic and overly positive
about themselves. Most people think they are smarter than average. Their risk is below
average for getting a disease or having a car accident, and above average for winning the
12
lottery or being professionally successful.

Law students are no exception to the tendency to think highly of their intelligence or
abilities. People who are accustomed to success, to performing above average, and to

11 Steven D. Levitt and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh. "An Economic Analysis Of A Drug-Selling Gang's
Finances," QuarterlyJournalof Economics, v. 115 (3, Aug.), 755-789 (2000).
12 Neil D. Weinstein, UnrealisticOptimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.,
806 (1980).

Richmond Journalof Law and the Public Interest

Winter 2006

beating the odds are even more likely to be overly optimistic about their future prospects.
Major law firms know that a tiny percentage of new associates will rise to become equity
partners, but they also know that most new associates will think that they are the ones who
will do it. Doing long hours of tedious work seems more worthwhile if there is a big payoff
at the end. This overly optimistic assessment of one's chances of becoming partner, and
reaping all the rewards associated with that position and status, probably also affects
students' decision to work at firms.

5. Loss Aversion

According to prospect theory, people evaluate outcomes based on the change those
outcomes represent from an initial reference point, rather than objectively evaluating the
outcome itself. Furthermore, losses from this reference point are weighted far more heavily
than gains from that same point. In one experiment, participants were told that a deadly bird
flu was going around and they had a choice of definitely saving 200 people or a 1/3 chance
of saving 600 people. In this test, people preferred, by a 3:1 ratio, the option of saving 200
people than a 1/3 chance of saving 600 people. But, when the exact same choice was
presented as either killing 400 people or a 1/3 chance of saving 600 people, the outcome was
reversed. By changing the reference point from living to dying, and therefore saving people
to killing them, the experimenters' changed people's preferences. This study shows the
importance of how choices are framed -- in particular, whether they are framed as negative
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or positive movement from the status quo.13
As I've mentioned before, firms do a good job of establishing themselves as the norm
for graduates of elite law schools. The vast majority of such students go to work at such
firms, they dominate on-campus recruiting, and they use gifts, cocktails, and presentations to
maintain a constant presence in law students' lives. They are particularly effective at using
summer experiences to re-enforce the primacy of the firm in the legal profession and
establish it as the norm for post-graduation employment from the top law schools, as I
explain below. In so doing, the firm job, and its high starting salary, becomes the norm and
expectation for graduates of these schools.
For a typical person in his mid- to late-twenties, a job paying $40,000, a typical
starting salary in a legal aid society, would seem average or even a little above average.
But, when law students use the large firm as a reference point, where salaries are typically
$140,000 for first-year associates, such ajob seems like an annual loss of $100,000. This is
a large sum of money by almost any standard, particularly when it is conceived of as a loss.
As Mark Kelman has discovered, a loss in income matters more to people than a gain
in income. Thus, Las Vegas gamblers are more willing to lose their "winnings" than their
other money, despite their equivalent values, because the former seems like a non-gain while
the latter seems like a loss. 14 Likewise, students who are content to live in small apartments
or dormitories with little income or spending money during law school are not satisfied with
a $40,000 job because they see it as a loss of money rather than a gain. Rather than using

13 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, XVLII
ECONOMETRICA, 263 (1979).
14 Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, ProductionTheory, and ldeology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL.
L. REv. 669 (1979).
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their present circumstances or those of other people their age as reference points, they use
the first-year associate position at major law firms as their reference point. This framing of
the post-law school professional choice is one of the big successes of law firms in recruiting
talent.

6. The Endowment Effect

Related to the concept of loss aversion is the endowment effect, which says that an
individual more highly values something once he owns it. Therefore, in one experiment,
students given initial ownership of a mug demanded significantly higher prices to sell it than
they would have paid to buy it. 15 This concept goes a long way toward explaining the
importance of summer associateships and early offers. By actually employing their recruit
for a period of time, the firm makes the student feel as though he has already begun working
at the firm. Undoubtedly, the work is on hold until he finishes law school, but the fact that
the work has already begun, in a sense, gives the student a certain ownership over the
position.
This effect is especially true for an accepted offer. A firm may make an offer to a
student as early as the fall of his second year. The student is allowed to accept the offer but
change his mind later. However, by accepting that offer, he attains a feeling of ownership
over it. To accept a later offer from a public interest organization (they recruit later than
firms, often waiting until spring of 3L year to make an offer), he would perceive it as giving
up a position he already has, as opposed to deciding between two competing offers.
15 Richard Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG., 39 (1980).
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Because of the endowment effect, he would place a higher value on the position that he
already "owns" than on the position he is being offered, just as the individual prefers the
mug he owns over the one he is being offered. These early offers endow the student with a
sense of ownership over the firm position, making him value it higher and be less likely to
give it up for an alternative.

C. Bounded Self-Interest

It seems strange to a lot of people that some students of elite law schools, albeit not
many, choose to work in legal settings where they will be paid far less than in other legal
positions that are available to them. One explanation for this is that people are not always
self-interest maximizing; that is, they care about other people, and are willing to sacrifice a
portion of their self-interest in order to help others. This could be seen as pure altruism, a
decision to do good for others without benefit to oneself. But, in fact, there is more to it
than that. Behavioral economists have discovered that, during bargaining situations, people
are willing to treat their counterpart fairly, even if that means retaining fewer benefits, as
long as that person is behaving fairly. Conversely, they will try to punish, even at cost to
themselves, negotiating partners who seem to behave unfairly. In a sense, they are willing
to sacrifice personal self-interest maximization in order to uphold a system that benefits all
16
based on honor, trust and fairness.

16

Amartya Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65 ECONOMETRICA, 745 (1997).
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The legal system, as a codification of the social contract, is just such a system. We
all agree to put constraints on ourselves, and make ourselves liable to rules and courts, in
order to create a system that will benefit everybody on balance. However, this system only
works if it is available to everybody. If an individual is constrained by the legal system, but
is not able to derive benefits from it by constraining others because he does not have access
to it, the system begins to break down. Attorneys at legal aids and other public interest
organizations make sure that people who might otherwise be unable to access the system
due to lack of money, education, or sophistication, are able to receive legal counsel and the
protections due them from the legal system. Those attorneys who sacrifice personal benefit
from practicing law in order to ensure access to those who might otherwise be left out of the
system are helping to maintain a system that benefits all. This kind of bounded self-interest
is a strong motivation for many attorneys who reject the firm route.

II. LAW SCHOOLS' RESPONSE TO STUDENTS' BOUNDED RATIONALITY

A. The Public Interest Requirement

According to traditional economic assumptions, people know what they want and
what is in their best interest. Therefore, a person's end cannot be questioned, only the
rationality of the means he uses to achieve that end. One joke has it that if a man said he
wanted to cut off his finger, a classical economist could only advise him to use a sharp knife.
As advances in behavioral science demonstrate, though, people do not always know what
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they want or what is in their best interest. A behavioral economist, therefore, would be more
willing than a traditional economist to have the government or other third party try to
influence human behavior in order to achieve desired social ends -- to counteract the harm
caused to individuals by their bounded rationality and willpower. For example, whereas a
traditional economist would support citizen informational campaigns in areas like health and
safety, a behavioral economist would favor consciously framing the information in
particular ways or using personal anecdotes in presenting the information in order to
counteract human limits on rationality and willpower.
With regard to career advising at law school, this same issue emerges. Assuming a
law school wants its graduates to go into public interest law, should it simply provide
information to students about such opportunities, along with information about private
sector opportunities, or should it consciously make efforts to influence its students to enter
public service careers? If what I argue in Part I is true -- that most students end up at law
firms despite the best interests of themselves and society due to bounded rationality and
willpower -- law schools should take steps to counteract these trends. This appears to be the
position many law school have taken in recent years. The public interest requirement is one
such step.
Some law schools, with the encouragement of the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS), make it mandatory for students to perform a certain amount of public
interest legal service as a condition of graduation.1 7 Critics of this policy argue against it on

17 Learning to Serve: The Findings and Proposalsof the AALS Commission on Pro Bono and Public Service
Opportunities, (1999) (the AALS Commission on Pro Bono and Public Service Opportunities

recommended "that law schools make available to all law students at least once during their law school
careers a well-supervised law-related pro bono opportunity and either require the students' participation or
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the grounds that it is paternalistic. They argue that a law school has no business telling
students how they should spend their free time or what kind of law they should practice. A
law school should simply train its students to be good lawyers, and let them make decisions
of personal morality or conscience on their own, in light of their personal religious and
ethical beliefs. This argument closely mirrors the neoclassical economic argument against
state intervention in decisions of personal morality.
Nevertheless, these requirements are increasingly popular at law schools across the
nation. It is an attempt to counteract some of the manifestations of bounded rationality I
mentioned above. For example, by forcing every student to have at least some exposure to
public interest law, it helps mitigate the availability heuristic -- the prominence of the large
firm in students' law school experience. It may also work against the tendency to see the
law firm as the norm of legal practice, which make the loss aversion and endowment effects
such strong factors in student post-graduation plans.

B. Loan Forgiveness

Some students complain that they want to do public interest, but are unable to do so
due to the large debt they have accumulated paying for college and law school. Loan
forgiveness programs are an attempt to address this problem by making it financially
possible for students to accept public service positions and meet their loan obligations.

8

find ways to attract the great majority of students to volunteer").find ways to attract the great majority of

students to volunteer."
18 See, American Bar Association, "Lifting the Burden: Law Student Debt as a Barrier to Public Service, The

Final Report of the ABA Commission on Loan Repayment and Forgiveness", 2003, for an analysis of the
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However, such programs have not been terribly successful. Law schools that have
implemented such programs have not seen significant increases in the number of graduates
going into public service.
This failure of loan forgiveness programs to significantly influence student behavior
may result from the fact that it does not seriously address the bounded rationality issues that
influence their decision to work at large firms. These programs do increase somewhat the
compensation received by a public interest attorney, so that he may earn the equivalent of
$50,000 to $60,000 instead of $40,000. In that regard, it may alter the cost-benefit analysis
a student undertakes in choosing a job after graduation. However, this compensation still
pales in comparison with the $140,000 that the same graduate can expect at a law firm.
And, by focusing on salary, it may actually encourage the focus on actual income, thus
subtly re-enforcing the bias against opportunity cost I mention in section I.B. 1. It certainly
does nothing to counteract the tendency to undervalue opportunity cost, nor does it
counteract any of the other manifestations of bounded rationality and willpower I mention
above.
Loan forgiveness programs are still worthwhile. For students who do decide to go
into public service, such programs can be helpful and, in some cases, even necessary, in
helping them manage their finances after graduation. However, while it they are beneficial
to those who independently decide to enter public service, they do little to encourage others
to make that decision.

problem and an overview of law schools' approaches to addressing it.
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III. PRESCRIPTIONS

The focus of this article is on the way bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest effect
post-graduation career plans of students from law schools, particularly by channeling them
toward associateships in large firms. A number of prescriptions could be imagined to
counter some of these biases. In this section, I present three suggestions to provide
examples of the kind of steps law schools could take to de-bias their students.

1. Payfor public interest organizationsto participatein on-campus interviewing.

Currently, on-campus interviewing -- the primary way students find their summer and postgraduation jobs -- is heavily dominated by firms. Many public interest organizations would
love to recruit at law schools, but they can not afford to participate in on-campus
interviewing. This situation re-enforces the perception that large firms are the norm in the
legal profession. As a result, students use the inflated firm salaries as the reference point for
evaluating other offers, seeing public interest employment as demanding a "loss" of income.
By presenting such organizations as equally valid practice settings and employment options,
law schools could help change the framework students use in evaluating job offers and
salaries. By countering the view of the law firm as the norm, this policy would also help
mitigate the availability and representativeness heuristics, as well as students' bounded
willpower. Students will be able to recall more examples of public interest attorneys they
can identify with and that they can model themselves after. Finally, the public interest
recruiters that come to campus will surely emphasize the advantages of their work setting -77
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the hours, atmosphere, autonomy, etc. -- thus counteracting the tendency to undervalue
opportunity cost.

2. Encouragestudents to work before entering law school.

Because students often enter law school with unstable preferences, they are vulnerable to
external influences, which the firms are happy to provide. If students have more concrete
preferences before entering law school, they would be less vulnerable to such outside
pressures. Anecdotally, I've noticed that students who have taken time off between college
and law school, typically working, have more realistic understandings of the professional
world and clearer ideas of their interests and preferences than students who come straight
from college. I believe law schools should encourage more of their students to spend time
working before beginning law school, which is the norm for business and public policy
schools. One way to do this is to favor applicants with work experience during the
admission process. By advertising and implementing this policy, the effect will be to
encourage more law school aspirants to work for a few years before applying to law school,
and to form a student body that has more professional and life experience, and therefore
more stable preferences.

3. Invite dissatisfiedformerfirm lawyers to campus

It may seem strange or even perverse to invite unhappy lawyers to speak to law students.
However, this may help counteract the over-optimism bias. It may also help counter the
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judgment heuristics students demonstrate by providing alternative models to the happy talk
they are likely to encounter from the many law firm recruiters that come to campus.

This article has used findings in behavioral economics to explain why law students continue
to pursue jobs at large firms despite the widespread knowledge that such position often lead
to professional unhappiness. They display bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest,
in ways that are damaging to themselves, the legal profession, and poor people who do not
have access to the legal advocacy they need. By first understanding the nature of the
problem and its underlying cause in the mental processes of law students, we can begin to
address these issues in a systematic and effective way. By reconnecting future lawyers to
the ethic of service, of achieving personal fulfillment through the employment of
professional skills to help those in need, we may be able to improve not only our profession,
but our society as well.

